What determines the foreign aid effort of donor countries? We review the existing literature on donors' aid budgets and examine which of the suggested variables robustly determine aid effort, measured as Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a share of gross national income. More specifically, we empirically test 16 hypotheses using panel econometric methods for member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the 1976-2008 period. To test for the robustness of our results, we extend our dataset to 48 possible determinants of aid budgets and apply an Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). In our fixed effects regressions, we find that aid inertia, the donor country's GDP per capita, the existence of an independent aid agency, and colonial history have a robust and quantitatively relevant impact on countries' aid efforts. Among the potential substitutes for aid, remittances exert a robust effect. Excluding year fixed effects, political globalization, Russian military capacity, peer effects, aid effectiveness, and government debt also play a significant role.
Introduction
The Monterrey Consensus reached at the United Nations (UN) summit on Financing for Development in 2002 asked for a substantial increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to help developing countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
1
Estimates by the World Bank and the UN suggested that additional annual ODA in the order of US$ 40-60 billion had to be raised to finance the MDGs (Clift 2007) . At the G8 meeting in Gleneagles in November 2005, the major donor countries promised to scale up ODA by US$ 50 billion and specifically to double annual aid to Africa by 2010.
2 However, with the advent of the recent financial crisis and economic slowdown, concerns mounted that donors would once again renege on earlier promises.
3 Frot (2009: 1) expected aid efforts to weaken significantly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis "unless preventive action is taken."
Indeed, according to critics, recent ODA data released by the OECD reveal "a massive shortfall" of more than one third of the US$50 billion committed in Gleneagles. 4 The question of which factors are driving donor generosity or causing frugality is thus of considerable relevance to the international development community, notably the aid recipient countries. All the more surprisingly, only scant empirical evidence exists on what determines the size of donor countries' overall aid budgets. This is in striking contrast to the extensive literature on the allocation of ODA across recipient countries (e.g., Kuziemko and
Werker 2006) and on aid effectiveness (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009) . What is more, the few existing studies analyzing the donors' overall aid effort differ substantially with respect to the countries and time periods covered so that their results are hardly comparable.
We contribute to the aid literature in several important ways. Section 2 reviews previous work and collects hypotheses on various economic and political factors underlying donors' aid efforts. Section 3 introduces our dataset covering 48 possible determinants of aid budgets. We employ panel econometric methods for 22 donor countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) over the period, and present the results in Section 4. To test for robustness, in Section 5, we vary the definition of the dependent variable and perform an Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). Finally, Section 6 concludes and derives policy implications.
In our fixed effects regressions, we find that aid inertia, the donor country's GDP per capita, the existence of an independent aid agency, and colonial history have a robust and quantitatively relevant impact on countries' aid efforts. Among the potential substitutes for aid, remittances exert a robust effect. Excluding time dummies, political globalization, Russian military capacity, peer effects, aid effectiveness, and government debt also play a significant role. Regressions with varying definitions of the dependent variable and the results of the EBA reveal that no additional variable is a robust determinant of aid efforts.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

Demand and supply for a public good
ODA is a public good supplied by the (governments of) donor countries. According to Mosley (1985) , however, the determinants of donor generosity can be modeled appropriately only if the demand for ODA by the taxpayers in the donor countries is also taken into account. This is even though taxpayers are typically assumed to be ignorant about the "price" of ODA, i.e., the part of total tax obligations needed per unit of "output." Mosley (1985: 375) argues, based on public opinion polls, that "taxpayers' demand for aid expenditures emerges […] as a humanitarian one, constrained by perceptions of whether the country could afford it or not." The proviso of affordability invites a first hypothesis on the determinants of aid budgets: The willingness of taxpayers to pay for ODA, and thus the size of the aid budget, is likely to increase with their average per-capita income. This also follows from Dudley (1979) who likens ODA to a luxury good demanded only when more basic needs are fulfilled.
Nevertheless, previous empirical results on the role of average incomes in the donor countries for their aid budgets are ambiguous. Two out of seven empirical studies do not find a statistically significant positive effect of per-capita income on aid effort (see summary in Table 1 ).
The humanitarian motive of taxpayers' demand for ODA suggests that their willingness to pay also depends on perceived needs in recipient countries. Olsen (1998: 608) introduces the concept of 'humane internationalism' in this context -the "acceptance of the principle that citizens of the industrial nations have moral obligations towards peoples and events beyond their borders." This may be most obvious in the case of famines and other major and well publicized disasters and emergencies, which tend to boost public and private giving. At the same time, taxpayers may be aware of more structural and persistent aspects of the need for aid. Hence, our second hypothesis maintains that aid budgets will increase with recipient need for ODA, revealed by temporary disasters as well as persistent poverty.
Surprisingly, this hypothesis has hardly received attention in previous empirical studies, with Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) providing a notable exception.
The taxpayers' willingness to pay may decrease, however, if the effectiveness of ODA to help overcome poverty in the recipient countries is in doubt. Especially in the 1990s, skepticism on the effectiveness of aid became widespread. According to our third hypothesis, the resulting 'aid fatigue' is likely to be one of the major determinants of aid budgets. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) proxy aid effectiveness by the share of evaluated
World Bank projects with a satisfactory outcome and find this success rate to be a statistically significant determinant of donors' aid budgets. Mosley's (1985) aid demand function considers indicators of the quality of ODA such as the degree of poverty-orientation and the degree of concessionality (grant element), supposing that a higher quality of aid increases taxpayers' willingness to pay.
Public support from taxpayers is crucial for democratically elected donor governments to supply ODA (OECD 2009 ). Yet, the reasoning of Mosley (1985) points to a more complex relationship between demand and supply in the "market" for ODA as a public good. In addition to demand pressures as discussed above, donor governments' supply of ODA can be expected to depend on several factors. Similar to other public expenditure items, inertia is likely to play an important role for the size of annual aid budgets (hypothesis 4). Since aid projects are typically carried out over several years, aid disbursements should evolve only slowly. Furthermore, the budgetary decision process in the donor countries is complex so that aid budgets are unlikely to change drastically on short notice. Short-term budget adjustments are also constrained to the extent that donors want to be reliable partners in international development cooperation. 5 Indeed, previous studies find a largely consistent positive effect of past aid effort on current budget size (see again Table 1 ).
5 This is not to ignore that aid volatility is a major issue at the level of individual recipient countries (see Bulir and Hamann 2003) .
Another implication of the public good character of ODA is more controversial.
Several analysts have argued that, from this perspective, the governments of larger donor countries would supply more ODA than those of small countries since the latter could freeride on the aid efforts of the former (e.g., Dudley 1979; Mosley 1985) . Nevertheless, our fifth hypothesis predicts a negative impact of the donor countries' population size on their aid efforts. 6 Round and Odedokun (2004) argue that larger countries are able to exploit economies of scale, e.g., with regard to the administrative costs of aid, so that they could achieve specified objectives with less relative effort. Conversely, small countries might be more generous in relative terms if the supply of ODA is cost-effective only beyond a certain threshold. Additionally, according to Bertoli et al. (2008) , larger and more heterogeneous countries are characterized by less social cohesion when compared to smaller countries, which could imply that they are less inclined to redistribute income. Most of the available empirical evidence confirms a negative relationship between population and aid effort (see Table 1 ).
Finally, the public good character of ODA might result in peer effects independently of the size of the various donor countries. The supply of ODA by one particular donor could be negatively correlated with the aid efforts of other donors if ODA is viewed as an international public good (Schweinberger and Lahiri 2006) . However, the correlation could also be positive if donors regard ODA as a "national public good with interaction between countries" (Dudley 1979: 565) . Complementarities would result from donors increasing their aid effort in line with the efforts of peers (Mosley 1985) . They might be strengthened through joint membership of donor countries in multilateral aid agencies. In their analysis of the allocation of aid, Davis and Klasen (2011) find that increases in the bilateral aid flows of one donor significantly increase those of others. As summarized in Table 1 , the available evidence on this sixth hypothesis is inconclusive.
International and domestic politics
Another set of hypotheses on the determinants of donor generosity is derived from political economy considerations. In the aid allocation literature, it has often been shown that donor countries grant more aid to former colonies (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000) . This might imply In addition to historical factors, the current degree of global engagement of donor countries is likely to shape their aid budgets (hypothesis 9). The number of international organizations in which a donor country is a member, the number of international nongovernmental organizations operating in a donor country, and the KOF Index of Globalization have been proposed as relevant political indicators (Lundsgaarde et al. 2007; Brech and Potrafke 2012) . 7 However, there is no empirical evidence that these indicators increase aid budgets. This could be because "international normative influences" (Lundsgaarde et al. 2007: 157) are relatively weak compared to political convictions held domestically.
8
Domestic political ideology could be revealed by "outcome" variables such as spending on social welfare and the overall size of government. According to Noël and Thérien (1995) , political preferences leading to higher social spending and more redistribution at home would also result in a stronger effort in international development cooperation (hypothesis 10). Larger governments mirror a higher propensity to redistribute and provide more room for granting aid (Bertoli et al. 2008) . Previous empirical studies find a positive 7 KOF is the acronym of the Swiss Economic Institute. 8 Alternatively, Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) explain this (non)finding by the fact that more globalized countries transmit ideas in favor and against foreign aid.
relationship between government size and aid (Bertoli et al. 2008; Round and Odedokun 2004) , whereas conclusive evidence on domestic transfers and social spending as determinants of aid budgets does not exist (Table 1) . Alternatively, Bertoli et al. (2008: 11) propose using the Gini coefficient as "a proxy of domestic solidarity that may influence the attitude towards international redistribution" and find the expected negative effect on aid generosity. While their results for the Gini coefficient are ambiguous, Round and Odedokun (2004) also find that inequality impacts upon aid budgets if the Gini coefficient is replaced by the income share held by the poorest 20 percent of the population.
Alternatively, the role political ideology plays regarding the size of aid budgets can be assessed by classifying the parties in power and/or the institutions in charge (Thérien and Noël 2000) . In particular, right-wing governments are often expected to provide less aid than left-wing governments, whose trust in markets is more limited and who are more prone to redistribution (hypothesis 11). On the other hand, right-wing governments may supply more aid as a means of promoting commercial and political self-interest. 9 Previous empirical findings appear to be inconclusive (Table 1) . Moreover, the impact of government ideology on aid budgets may not be confined to the cabinet currently in office. To capture the footprint of previous cabinets, Thérien and Noël (2000) propose cumulative scores of left and rightwing cabinet members as a possible determinant of current aid effort.
10
As stressed by Round and Odedokun (2004) , the effect of the general classification of governments on the size of aid budgets becomes more ambiguous once specific aspects of the executive branch and its relations with other branches of the political and institutional system are taken into account. For instance, Round and Odedokun expect the aid budget to increase when incongruent ideologies are represented within the government (e.g., coalition of parties in power), the opposition is strong, and the system of checks and balances involves Odedokun (2003, 2004) .
expected to have a stronger commitment to international solidarity and support higher amounts of aid to developing countries (Togeby 1994).
12
In contrast to the argument that conflicting interests within the political system may result in more aid, Bertoli et al. (2008) (2007) do not find evidence that the heightened interest of donors in transition countries during the 1990s came at the expense of ODA recipients.
It is also disputed whether foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing host countries replaces ODA. On the one hand, FDI may reduce the need for aid, while on the other it could be associated with more ODA if FDI is officially supported through aid provision. 15 Similarly, foreign aid could also be seen as a tool to promote trade. Accordingly, Tingley (2010) suspects trade-dependent countries, with trade dependency measured by the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP, to be more 'generous' donors. This is, however, not supported by empirical evidence (Table 1) . Following a slightly different approach, Lundsgaarde et al. (2007: 162) conjecture that a larger trade deficit with developing countries, a perceived indicator of job exports, "triggers domestic opposition to aid, thereby creating pressures for politicians to pare down aid budgets." Moreover, Bertoli et al. (2008) consider remittances to developing countries as a possible alternative to ODA. However, using the share of immigrants in the donor country's population as a proxy, ODA does not appear to be affected by remittances in to Bertoli et al. (2008) .
It would also be desirable to test for complementarities and substitution effects between ODA and private aid. Private charities and companies are widely believed to play an 15 The insignificant finding of Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) Crowding-out effects are analyzed theoretically in the model of Schweinberger and Lahiri (2006) on the supply of official and private aid. However, it is almost impossible to subject theoretical predictions to rigorous empirical tests since comprehensive and consistent data on private aid hardly exist.
Finally, domestic expenditure items may also replace aid. For instance, Boschini and
Olofsgård (2007) regard military expenditures as a substitute for aid in achieving security interests. By contrast, Round and Odedokun (2004: 299) hypothesize that aid and military expenditures are complements since aid can be used "to promote donor military adventurism," for example to buy support to build a military base on the recipient's territory.
This hypothesis is not rejected in their empirical analysis, at conventional levels of significance.
Method and Data
We now turn to the empirical test of these 16 hypotheses. Our analysis covers all 22 countries As a measure for the generosity of donors, we use data on the donor countries' ODA as provided by the DAC. 18 In order to control for the size of the economy, we follow the previous literature and express aid budgets as a percentage of gross national income.
19
Obviously, this variable does not only vary with a country's supply of foreign aid, but also with its economic cycle. In an economic recession, for example, this measure will rise even if the amount of aid is constant. However, it is a good proxy for a donor's aid generosity as it is 16 To promote food security and nutrition in Africa, the G-8 countries agreed at their 38 th summit in Camp David to strengthen the role of private capital in their development strategy (see http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2012/fs120518.html; accessed May 2012). 17 Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted according to Rubin's (1987) combination rules. Note that we use logistic regression to impute dummy variables. 18 The DAC statistics do not include loans repayable within one year, grants and loans for military purposes, nor transfer payments to private individuals. 19 The use of ODA divided by GNI or GDP is standard in the literature. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) , however, use log aid instead of the share. As an alternative variable, Roodman (2004) uses net aid transfer (which nets out interest payments). Also see Appendix C for the various definitions of the dependent variable in the aid budget literature.
more 'painful' to spend the same amount of foreign aid during a recession. Moreover, the measure is easy to interpret as it is comparable with the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI as development aid. Figure 1 provides an overview of how each donor's aid effort evolved over the 1976-2008 period.
In our baseline regressions, we use net disbursements, i.e., aid flows net of loan principal repayments at the time the actual transfer took place. To test for the robustness of our results, we later replace aid disbursements with commitments. We also run separate regressions for bilateral and multilateral aid disbursements to analyze differences in the determinants of aid effort between these two aid channels. In addition, we rerun our regressions after excluding debt relief from net disbursements, as in Bertoli et al. (2008) .
To test hypothesis 1, we take data on GDP per capita from the World Development To assess the role of colonial history (hypothesis 7), we compute a measure similar to that used in Bertoli et al. (2008) . Combining data on colonial linkages from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006) Sixth and seventh, as in Round and Odedokun (2004) , the share of military expenditure in the donor country's GDP and the share of military personnel in the donor country's labor force proxy for strategic interests that might be pursued through aid provision (World Bank 2009).
We lag all explanatory variables to account for the fact that budget decisions are typically taken in the year prior to the actual aid disbursement. Moreover, the use of lagged explanatory variables mitigates endogeneity concerns.
24 The OECD (2009) has classified the organizational structures of donors into four models. The variable is coded as 1 if the donor country is classified as Model 3 ("A ministry has overall responsibility for policy and a separate executing agency is responsible for implementation") or Model 4 ("A ministry or agency, which is not the ministry of foreign affairs, is responsible for both policy and implementation"). The variable is coded as 0 in the case of Model 1 ("Development co-operation is an integral part of the ministry of foreign affairs which is responsible for policy and implementation") and Model 2 ("A Development Co-operation Directorate has the lead role within the ministry of foreign affairs and is responsible for policy and implementation"). Semiautonomous bodies such as the New Zealand Agency for International Development and the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation are therefore coded as 0 in contrast to the definition in Bertoli et al. (2008) . 25 The correlation between the aid agency dummies is 0.72. Table 2 shows the main results. In column 1, we explain net aid disbursements (as a percentage of GNI) with all variables that vary over donor countries and cannot be considered as substitutes or complements of aid. In addition, we include dummies for all years and donors to account for time effects and donor-specific characteristics. Column 2 reports the results of a general-to-specific analysis where we successively exclude from column 1 the variable with the lowest t-statistic, until only variables remain that are significant at the tenpercent level. We then reintroduce all variables one at a time, keeping those which turn out to be significant, at the ten-percent level at least. We repeated this procedure until we converged to a final model.
Results
As can be seen from column 2, few variables significantly affect aid effort. The results
show that aid budgets increase with the donor country's GDP per capita, at the one-percent level of significance. This is in line with hypothesis 1, arguing that donors are more willing to provide a public good when they become richer. Specifically, the coefficient of (logged) GDP per capita shows that the short-run increase in aid budgets is almost 0.016 percentage points following a ten-percent increase in per-capita GDP. This increase corresponds to 2.3 percent of the UN goal to achieve an aid effort of 0.7 percent of GNI. The lagged dependent variable is highly significant, indicating persistence (in line with hypothesis 4). By taking the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable into account, the long-run effect of a ten-percent increase in GDP per capita amounts to an increase in aid effort of 0.065 percentage points, i.e., more than 9 percent of the UN goal.
Countries have larger aid budgets when they entertain an independent aid agency, at the one-percent level of significance, which is in line with hypothesis 13. Quantitatively, the existence of an independent aid agency increases aid budgets by 0.038 percentage points -a non-negligible change that corresponds to 5.5 percent of the aid effort demanded by the UN.
By contrast, aid efforts weaken with more people living in former colonies, at the five-percent level, supporting the view that ODA is a substitute for colonial history (hypothesis 7). A tenpercent increase in the size of the population living in former colonies decreases aid effort by 0.008 percentage points.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate the analysis including those variables that do not vary across donor countries such as time-variant conditions in recipient countries, aid effectiveness and peer effects. These estimations thus exclude the dummies for each year. In column 3, we add these variables to the baseline of column 1, while column 4 shows the results of the general-to-specific analysis. In line with the results from column 2, aid budgets increase with independent aid agency. Three of the additional variables are also significant at conventional levels, those being our measure for aid effectiveness (hypothesis 3), peer group effects With the inclusion of the additional variables (and the exclusion of the year dummies), two additional variables turn out to be significant at the five-percent level according to the general-to-specific analysis. As can be seen in column 4, aid effort increases with more political globalization and a lower debt burden of the donor country, as suggested by hypotheses 9 and 14. Nevertheless, the estimations reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 resemble each other in that most of the hypotheses introduced in Section 2 are not supported by the data. We next turn to those variables that could be considered to be alternatives to, or complements of, ODA (hypothesis 16). By including them one at a time in the specification in column 2 of Table 2 , we find most of them to be unrelated to aid budgets, at conventional levels of significance (Table 3) . This is largely in line with the previous literature, which mostly finds insignificant or mixed effects of other international transactions on ODA (see Table 1 ). The exception in Table 3 is remittances and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers as a share of GDP, which increase aid effort, at the five-percent level. An increase of ten percentage points in remittances paid leads to an increase in the aid effort by 0.065 percentage points, i.e., almost one tenth of the UN goal to provide 0.7 percent of donor GNI as ODA. This finding may be explained by a greater awareness regarding the need for aid in donor countries with a larger diaspora of nonresident workers. Yet it is open to question whether higher remittances are actually causal for stronger aid efforts. It cannot be ruled out that nonresident workers prefer moving where governments and the public appear to be more generous in supporting poorer people, either by granting ODA or by offering employment opportunities. The previous results for the group of statistically significant determinants of aid effort are not affected when extending the specification to other international transactions.
The next section tests for the robustness of our main results to the choice of the dependent variable and to the selection of specific combinations of control variables.
Robustness
We examine the robustness of our main results along two important dimensions. First, we replicate column 1 of Table 2 and the subsequent general-to-specific analysis based on four alternative definitions of the dependent variable. Second, our results might depend on the particular choice of control variables included in the regressions. We therefore run an EBA to test for robustness with respect to the particular set of controls.
Starting with the alternative measures of aid effort, Table 4 shows remarkably robust results. In columns 1 and 2, we reproduce the results from Table 2 to facilitate comparisons.
Columns 3 and 4 show the results for disbursements excluding debt relief, while columns 5 and 6 substitute disbursements with commitments. Excluding debt relief leaves our previous results qualitatively unchanged. When using commitments rather than disbursements, the results remain similar. Specifically, the effects of all previously significant variables are virtually unchanged. In line with hypothesis 12, we now also find that aid budgets increase when incongruent ideologies are present within the government, as measured by the government fractionalization index. A ten-percent increase in the probability that two deputies picked at random come from two different government parties increases aid effort by 0.008 percentage points.
The remaining estimations in Table 4 separate bilateral aid (columns 7 and 8) from aid channeled via multilateral institutions (columns 9 and 10). Again, previous findings are fairly robust. In addition, we find some support for hypothesis 12 when considering only bilateral aid. Specifically, aid efforts increase with the share of women in parliament, who appear to be more concerned about international solidarity. If the share of parliament seats held by women increases by ten percentage points, a donor country's aid effort increases by 0.011 percentage points, on average. Unsurprisingly, aid channeled through multilateral institutions is not affected by colonial history, at conventional levels of significance. It is also intuitive that contributions to multilateral aid budgets increase with a donor's political globalization and the number of IGOs the donor is a member of (hypothesis 9).
To examine the sensitivity of our results with respect to the choice of control variables, we employ (variants of) an EBA, as proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) . 27 We estimate equations of the following form:
where y i,t represents the aid effort of donor i in year t. M is a vector of explanatory variables that "survived" the general-to-specific procedure applied in Section 4 (as shown in column 2 of Table 2 ). F represents variables of interest that we added to the base specification one at a time from the set of control variables. The vector Z contains up to three of the remaining 27 The Stata code we use follows Gassebner, Lamla and Sturm (2011).
possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt 1992). λ i and μ t represent donor and time dummies. The error term is v.
The EBA test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme bound for β F -i.e., the lowest value for β F minus two standard deviations -is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β F -i.e., the highest value for β F plus two standard deviations -is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to aid budgets. Sala-i-Martin (1997) variables to be robust. Clearly, some of the models might be misspecified, indicating, for example, the insignificance of a particular variable due to multicollinearity. Therefore, while we cannot rule out that variables which do not reach the threshold of 0.95 have a "true" effect on aid efforts, we can be confident that those variables above the threshold are robust determinants of aid budgets. Table 5 presents the results. We report the EBA for the models in columns 2 and 4 of Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) , with the lower and the upper bound being on one side of zero. Specifically, this is the case for GDP per capita and inertia in panel A; GDP per capita, inertia, peer effect and colonial history in panel B; and inertia in panel C. The results reveal that the variables in the "narrow" set of control variables are significant at the ten-percent level in almost all regressions run. Importantly, the results also show that hardly any of the additional variables can be considered to be robust determinants of aid effort, the only exception being political globalization (with a positive average coefficient).
In summary, our model is robust to the definition of the dependent variable and to the inclusion of different combinations of control variables.
Conclusion
Chances appear to be slim that, in the short run, donor countries will succeed in mobilizing substantial amounts of additional foreign aid to help recipient countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals. At the same time, recent concerns that aid efforts will suffer a major setback due to financial stress, rising debt and economic slowdown in major donor countries appear to be overblown. Rather, aid efforts are most likely to remain weaker than do-gooders may wish, and more resilient than alarmists may fear.
ODA is a slow-moving phenomenon according to our assessment of various possible determinants of aid effort. Most of the hypotheses derived from the previous literature failed to pass rigorous robustness tests. This especially applies, and perhaps most surprisingly, to almost all factors capturing short-term changes in overall budget constraints and macroeconomic conditions. Only a donor country's debt burden showed a statistically significant negative effect in parts of our empirical analyses. Even changes in the ideological orientation of donor governments and diverging interests in domestic politics show, at best, little effect. Furthermore, varying needs of recipient countries may affect the allocation of aid across countries, but do not appear to increase donor generosity on the whole.
Aid effort by individual donor countries increases with their own income per capita.
The quantitative impact of rising domestic income on the ODA-to-GNI ratio is quite modest in the short run. However, the impact is far from negligible in the longer run when taking the strong inertia of aid effort into account. Donors that channel aid through politically less dependent agencies, rather than ministries responsible for foreign affairs, are significantly more generous. All the same, this is not a panacea either, especially once it is taken into account that donors are inclined, according to our findings, to free-ride on the aid efforts of other donors. Significant and negative peer effects suggest that donors consider foreign aid to be an international public good, rather than a national public good. Odedokun (2003, 2004) Dreher and Fuchs ( Odedokun (2003, 2004) Observed effect on aid budgets in different studies (Table 2, Notes: Shows the average coefficient across regressions ("Beta") and its standard error ("Std.err."). "%Sign." indicates the share of the regressions in which the coefficient is significant at the tenpercent level at least; "CDF-U" is the unweighted cumulative distribution function. The "lower (upper) bound" is the smallest (largest) coefficient minus (plus) two standard deviations. The variables listed are those included in the regressions achieving the extreme bounds (not shown if the bounds are on the same side of zero). 
